CHAPTER VI

Impact of Migration on the Demographic and Religious Landscapes of Central European Countries: Legal Perspectives

Dalibor Đukić

Abstract

This study examines the role of migration in transforming the demographic and religious landscapes of European countries, with a special focus on Central Europe. Since the 1950s, Europe has faced low population growth rates, which stagnated by the end of the 20th century. Migration has played a key role in reversing this trend, particularly in Central European countries such as Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Czechia, and Slovakia, although the proportion of foreign-born residents in these countries remains below the European Union average. In 2022, member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development saw significant increases in asylum applications, labour migration, and international students, with family migration a leading cause of new permanent migration. Migrant populations tend to cluster in urban areas, especially in Central European capitals, except in Poland. By 2023, Europe's population growth was bolstered by positive net migration, especially following the COVID-19 pandemic and displacement of persons from Ukraine. Despite migration's role in population growth, its long-term effectiveness and the challenges it poses to Europe's cultural, social, and political fabric are debated. The increasing non-working-age population strains healthcare systems and elevates old-age dependency ratios, threatening economic growth and productivity. Migration alone cannot offset the declining fertility rates; hence, pro-natalist policies are crucial. This study highlights the influence of migrants' religiosity on Europe's religious diversity, with implications for secularisation trends. The projected growth of religious groups, including Muslims, necessitates reassessing and reformulating legislation on

Dalibor Đukić (2024) 'Impact of Migration on the Demographic and Religious Landscapes of Central European Countries: Legal Perspectives'. In: Anikó Raisz (ed.) *Migration and Central Europe. Challenges and Legal Responses,* pp. 261–284. Miskolc–Budapest, Central European Academic Publishing.

https://doi.org/10.54237/profnet.2024.armace_6

religions in Europe to ensure sustainable pluralism. Ultimately, addressing Europe's demographic challenges requires supporting the native population's fertility rates, enhancing labour productivity, facilitating continuous education, and providing flexible employment options after retirement. These measures, while not globally altering population numbers, aim to sustain a capable environment for future sustainable population growth.

Keywords: migration, demography, population ageing, workforce shortages, religion and religiosity, religious pluralism.

1. Introduction

The word "demography" consists of two Greek words: *demos* (δῆμος), which refers to ordinary people or ordinary citizens, and *graphein* (γράφειν), which means writing or study about a particular topic. This word was first used by Achille Guillard in 1855 in his famous work titled Elements de Statistique Humaine ou Demographie Comparee.[1] Guillard's primary focus within demography encompassed a comprehensive understanding of populations, including their numerical aspects; overall dynamics; and physical, societal, intellectual, and ethical conditions. His exploration of population size, distribution, demographic processes, and structural aspects foreshadowed the foundations of contemporary demography.[2] Demography is usually divided into two traditions: formal demography, which is concerned with 'the precise mathematical measurement of the three demographic processes of fertility, mortality, and migration' and social demography, which examines 'the determinants and consequences of population size, distribution, and composition and of the demographic processes of fertility, mortality, and migration that determine them'.[3] According to the classic definition outlined by Hauser and Duncan, 'Demography is the study of the size, territorial distribution, and composition of population, changes therein, and the components of such changes, which may be identified as natality, mortality, territorial movement (migration), and social mobility (change of status)'.[4]

Demography is usually considered an applied discipline. Although a basic demographic theory is necessary for collecting and processing demographic data, the main contribution of demographic studies is providing proposals for real-world problems. The results of demographic analyses are, therefore, often applied using

1 Guillard, 2010.
2 Thomas, 2018, p. 1.
3 Murdock and Ellis, 2020, p. 4; Keely, 2000, p. 44; Teitelbaum, 2008, p. 52.
4 Hauser and Duncan, 1959, p. 2.

non-demographic factors.[5] This study examines how demographic theories, concepts, and data contribute to decision-making that affects the legal regulation of migrations.

Accordingly, this study examines the impact of migration on the demographic and religious landscapes of Europe and Central European states, employing various scientific methods, including the dogmatic, axiological, comparative, and demographic methods. These methods contribute to assessing the influence of fertility, mortality, average life expectancy, and migration on the demographic landscape of Europe.[6] The research is closely connected to the question of religious shifts in European societies and the impact of migration on them. The hypothesis under investigation is whether migration can resolve the main demographic challenges of European states and how it affects their ethnic composition and religious landscape.

This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the intersection between migration and demography, analysing the demographic aspect of migration and its implications on demographic shifts in Europe and Central European countries. Section 3 briefly presents the current demographic landscape of Europe and the European Union (EU). Section 4 then delves into various aspects related to the intersections between migration and population decline in Europe, exploring the extent to which migration can reverse the population decline in European countries.

Section 5 analyses other important demographic processes, focusing on the impact of immigration on population ageing and workforce shortages in Europe. The final section of the chapter concentrates on the influence of migration on the religious landscape of Europe and future trends in Europe's religious shift. Migration contributes to an increase in individuals with religious affiliations while introducing new religious communities and practices that need accommodation within European legal systems. The aim is to highlight tendencies in the religious affiliation of the European population and the effects of migration on them. The conclusion in section 6 summarises the main findings of the analysis.

2. Demography and migration

While demography delves into human populations broadly, not all population characteristics fall within the scope of a demographic analysis. As evident in the outlined definitions of formal and social demography, three fundamental demographic processes—fertility, mortality, and migration—emerge. This study focuses on migrations and their influence on demographic structure. Migration, within demographic

5 Thomas, 2018, pp. 2–5.

6 For more details on demographic methods, see Yusuf, Swanson, and Martins, 2014, pp. 97, 123, 143, 173.

theory, is delineated as the process wherein individuals, families, or groups relocate from one place to another. A detailed examination of the term "migration" follows. However, it is pertinent to note R. Thomas's observation that, in the contemporary world, migration holds greater societal implications than patterns of fertility or mortality.[7] Fertility and mortality have diminished in significance primarily because of declining fertility and mortality rates.

Demographers focus on not individual attributes but rather the collective traits of groups of people. Demography is widely regarded as the study of human populations.[8] Typically, a population constitutes an agglomeration of various individual units capable of self-reproduction. The foundation for this grouping can stem from diverse factors, although among the most significant populations today are the global population and individual nations within specific geographic boundaries, encompassing their respective inhabitants.[9] While each person may possess a "demographic profile", demographers are primarily concerned with the attributes of larger aggregates—a community, state, or nation. It is crucial to note that considerable variation exists within any group concerning its attributes. Any population's members might display a spectrum of values for various attributes. Therefore, what captivates the demographer's interest is the "average" characteristics of the population.[10] This chapter focuses on the demographic profile of European countries, with a special emphasis on Central European states, and the impact of migrations on their demographic landscape.

Demography plays a crucial role in shaping social policies, managing populations, and regulating migrations. As such, the findings of demographic research can serve as a strong foundation for the development and understanding of both domestic and international migration laws and regulations.

Defining migrants and migration can also be challenging. As mentioned, migration is the third population change component. From the demographic point of view, it is the most difficult process to measure.[11] Furthermore, it is most dynamic and complex.[12] While the number of births per woman is around two and death occurs to each individual only once, migration proves to be significantly more recurrent in Western societies. Current estimates suggest that an average American relocates approximately 20 times throughout their lifespan from birth to death.[13] Especially difficult to measure is temporary and circular migration.[14] Not only is migration challenging to register and measure, but it also holds the most significant influence on population changes.

7 Thomas, 2018, p. 12.
8 Murdock and Ellis, 2020, p. 4.
9 Bean and Brown, 2015, p. 67.
10 Thomas, 2018, p. 2.
11 Murdock and Ellis, 2020, p. 134.
12 Thomas, 2018, p. 151.
13 Winthrop, 2015.
14 Constant, Nottmeyer, and Zimmermann, 2013, p. 55.

Migration can be defined as 'a physical move involving an intended permanent change in residence'.[15] A permanent change in residence signifies the individual's or household's intention to remain in the new residence for an unspecified duration. A residence is characterised as the location where a person typically sleeps and eats. Possessing any form of residence suggests a level of permanence in suitable housing, although specific groups may lack officially recognised residences.

Migration encompasses two primary categories: internal and international. Individuals involved in migration may relocate either between nations or within a singular country. Internal migration signifies a change in residence within a specific country and is typically less regulated compared to international migration. Demographers classify individuals moving into an area as in-migrants, while those departing from an area are labelled out-migrants. International migration denotes the purposeful and enduring movement from one country to another. Those entering a country are denoted as immigrants, while those leaving are termed emigrants. Each nation establishes regulations and policies governing international migration, particularly immigration. Immigration laws regulate the entry conditions and criteria, country-specific limitations on acquiring formal residence permissions, and related procedures.[16] Generally, countries do not impose restrictions on emigration since citizens typically have the liberty to depart from the country as long as another nation permits entry. Exceptions to this rule may arise in specific situations, such as during periods of martial law.[17]

Migration can be also categorised as voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary migration is initiated by the migrant's choice and typically involves moves driven by economic needs, retirement, family reasons, or simply a desire for change. Contrastingly, involuntary migration commonly arises from political or religious persecution, wars, civil unrest, or natural disasters such as famines. This distinction has fuelled discussions regarding the duties of states towards migrants. At least two opposing views can be identified. The first one perceives voluntary migration as a mere preference and free choice of a migrant that does not deserve any special treatment by institutions. The other view represents those who advocate for migrants' rights and tend to classify all current migrations as involuntary.[18] Consequently, the distinction between refugees and migrants was based on the criteria of voluntariness. According to this distinction, refugees are those who have left their homes involuntarily.[19] However, involuntary migration on an international scale presents a considerable challenge in the 21st century. Factors such as war, famine,[20] climate change, persecution, and societal disruptions have led to a crisis concerning displaced individuals

15 Thomas, 2018, p. 152.
16 Ibid.
17 For example, during the martial law in Ukraine, men aged 18– 60 years may be mobilised and have no right to leave Ukraine; VisitUkraine.today, 2023.
18 Ottonelli and Torresi, 2013, p. 784.
19 Brettell, 2015, p. 198.
20 Carney, 2015, p. 10.

worldwide.[21] Even though the distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary migration is not always crucial, it can have significant consequences for the legal status of migrants and refugees.

Another critical distinction lies between legal and illegal immigration. Legal immigration involves entry into a country with formal permission, allowing for temporary or permanent residence. Illegal immigrants, conversely, enter a country without proper legal authorisation.[22] Keeping record of illegal immigrants is almost impossible, and therefore limited data are available on illegal migrants. Although the growth of illegal immigration led to improvements in border monitoring and internal police activities, it is often connected with income inequality, problems of public health protection, low performance of public institutions, etc.

At the international level, there is no universally accepted definition of either migration or migrant. The United Nations (UN) International Organization for Migration defines migration as

> The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.[23]

The same organisation interprets "migrant" as an umbrella term that reflects

> … the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students.[24]

These definitions, however, are not generally accepted and should not bear any legal consequences.

Two general approaches are used to define the aforementioned terms: the inclusivist and residualist views. The inclusivist view defines migrants as individuals who

21 According to Brettell and Hollifield, 2015, p. 2,
At the end of 2020, the number of "persons of concern" to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was 82.4 million (1 percent of the world's population), including 26.4 million refugees, 4.1 million asylum seekers, 48 million internally displaced people, and a relatively new category, 5.4 million Venezuelans forced to flee their country, a number that continues to rise.

22 Thomas, 2018, p. 154.

23 International Organization for Migration, 2011, p. 62.

24 International Organization for Migration, 2019, p. 132.

have moved from their usual place of residence, regardless of their legal status and motivation for moving. This broad definition includes refugees, foreign workers, trafficking victims, trailing spouses, international students, and other individuals falling under various categories. By contrast, the residualist view defines migrants as people who have relocated for any reason other than fleeing war or persecution, making them a diverse category of individuals who share the characteristic of not being refugees.[25] Thus, human migration can be classified into various types based on different factors such as reasons, territory, and duration. Some examples of human migration types that have not been mentioned include economic, environmental, and seasonal migration.

The focal point of the disagreement lies in determining whether refugees should fall under the category of "migrants". Despite the widespread acceptance of the inclusive viewpoint, the UN Refugee Agency advocates for the residualist stance, emphasising the distinction between refugees and migrants. This differentiation is justified by the assertion that confusion between these terms poses problems for both groups.[26] The agency's position is attributed to its aim of safeguarding its specific interests within inter-agency power conflicts, stemming from the International Organization for Migration joining the UN in 2016 and becoming the UN Migration Agency.[27]

Without delving into the highly significant and intriguing debate about distinguishing between migrants, refugees, and other "people on the move",[28] this chapter treats migration as an umbrella term encompassing all the aforementioned categories.

3. Demographic landscape of Europe and the EU

The global population has exhibited sustained growth over centuries, with varying growth rates that peaked in the early 1960s and subsequently declined. Europe experienced consistently low growth rates since 1950, even reaching stagnation by the end of the preceding century. However, migration served as a pivotal factor in reversing this trend, contributing to an upsurge in growth rates.[29] The region of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and

25 Carling, 2023, p. 400.
26 UNHCR, 2016, paras. 2–7.
27 Carling, 2023, p. 400. Ramji-Nogales (2017, p. 10) noted that 'Contemporary interpretations of refugee law, particularly as interpreted in the popular debate, draw a stark binary between worthy refugees and unworthy economic migrants'.
28 '"People on the move" can loosely be defined as people who are moving from one place to another for relatively long periods of time'. Pijnenburg and Rijken, 2021, p. 274.
29 Willekens, 2015, p. 13.

the EU demonstrate considerable percentages of foreign-born inhabitants, surpassing 10% and 13% of their respective total populations. Central Europe showcases diverse scenarios: Poland and Hungary have experienced considerable increases in their foreign-born populations, with Poland witnessing a doubling since 2012.[30] Yet, these populations represent less than 3% or 6.5% of their total populations, respectively.[31] These figures exclude temporary protection recipients primarily from Ukraine. Despite notable growth rates, these countries maintain a relatively low proportion of foreign-born residents compared to the total population. Conversely, Slovenia observed a noteworthy 28% surge in its foreign-born population over the last decade, reaching 14% of the total population;[32] this highlights a distinct situation wherein growth rates may be moderate or low, but the proportion exceeds the European average. Lastly, countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic exhibit lower growth rates (16% and 34%, respectively) and a smaller proportion of foreign-born residents, hovering around 4.3% to 4.2% of their total population, respectively.[33] Overall, while the foreign-born populations in most Central European countries are growing, their proportion relative to the total population remains rather low, falling below the EU average.

In 2022, OECD nations documented remarkable levels of international migration, with some countries in these regions reporting record-high figures. There was a notable increase across all migration categories. New asylum applications even surpassed the records seen in 2015/2016. Additionally, there was a significant surge in labour migration and temporary labour migration. For the first time in history, the count of international students approached nearly 2 million. Family migration retained its status as the leading category for new permanent-type migration, constituting 40% of all such migration. Meanwhile, managed labour migration and free mobility each accounted for 21% of the overall permanent-type migration.[34]

Migrant populations tend to concentrate more in specific regions within countries, notably the capital and urban areas, as compared to native-born populations. Within Europe, non-EU migrants exhibit a stronger inclination than EU migrants to cluster in these urbanised regions. The surge in immigrant populations over the past decade has been particularly notable in urban areas. In Central Europe, capital-city regions overwhelmingly harbour the highest proportions of immigrant populations, with Poland being the exception to this trend. Regions characterised by high proportions of well-educated native residents often mirror similar proportions of well-educated immigrant populations. This suggests a trend where highly educated foreign-born individuals tend to settle in regions akin to those chosen by their native-born counterparts.[35]

30 OECD, 2023, pp. 236, 262.
31 OECD, 2023, pp. 236, 262.
32 OECD, 2023, p. 270.
33 OECD, 2023, pp. 222, 268.
34 OECD, 2023, pp. 11–12.
35 OECD and European Union, 2018, p. 38.

The heightened migration rates are poised to significantly impact the demographic landscape of Europe. Migration, especially immigration, is viewed as a potential remedy for key demographic challenges prevalent in Europe, including population decline, ageing, low fertility rates, and labour scarcity. Immigration directly contributes to bolstering the total population of host countries, thereby exerting an immediate influence on population growth.

Moreover, there is an anticipation that the influx of young individuals within the working age bracket through immigration will alter the age distribution, potentially skewing it towards a younger demographic. Additionally, there exists a hypothesis that the presence of young immigrants may elevate the fertility rate, given that migrant populations in Europe tend to exhibit higher fertility rates compared to native populations. Lastly, immigration is perceived as an immediate and effective solution to address the escalating labour shortages observed across European countries. These hypotheses concerning the impact of migration on demographic shifts in Europe will be methodically tested and analysed in subsequent sections of this chapter.

4. Population decline and migration in Europe

In 2023, Europe's population reached approximately 742.2 million, showing a modest increase of 2.2 million compared to 2013. Since the 1960s, Europe's population growth has declined significantly, reaching negative figures in the mid-1990s. Although there has been a slight recovery since the low point of -0.07% in 1998, the growth rate for 2020 remained modest at just 0.04%.[36] Vaclav Smil, a Canadian professor, noticed years ago that

> In 1900 Europe (excluding Russia) had nearly 20 percent of the world's population and accounted for roughly 40 percent of the global economic product; 100 years later it had less than 9 percent of all people and produced less than 25 percent of the global output…By 2050 its population share will slip to about 6 percent of the global total, and its share of global economic product may be as low as 10 percent: these are hardly trends leading toward global dominance.[37]

Europe is expected to lose 11% of its population by 2050 if no immigration takes place, while the global population will increase by 32%.

From the beginning of the 21st century until 2020, the EU experienced population growth. This increase in population was the result of the EU's enlargement, positive natural change, and net migration. Between 1952 and 2010, six expansions

36 Statista Research Department, 2023, para. 1.
37 Smil, 2005, pp. 605–643, p. 609.

resulted in the addition of 248 million individuals to the EU, constituting 70% of its overall growth. Demographic expansion, encompassing both natural population growth and international migration, accounted for 72 million or 30% of the total.[38] However, between 2020 and 2022, the EU's total population declined by 585,000 individuals, primarily due to the COVID-19 pandemic. By 1 January 2023, the EU's total population rebounded to 448.4 million. Eurostat attributed this growth to increased migratory movements post-COVID-19 and the mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine who received temporary protection status in EU Member States. In 2022, deaths continued to outnumber live births in the EU, resulting in negative natural population change. The overall population increase in 2022 was solely due to positive net migration, with deaths surpassing live births. In summary, the natural change in the EU population was outweighed by net migration, resulting in a population increase. Net migration significantly rose from 1.1 million in 2021 to 2.9 million in 2022, playing a crucial role in population growth. The anticipated increase in deaths due to an ageing population suggests that the EU's future population trends will heavily rely on the contribution of net migration, especially if fertility rates remain relatively low.[39]

Among the countries with the highest population decrease are several Central European states. A decrease in population was recorded in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia due only to natural change, while in Serbia, the decline was more a result of negative net migration. Some Central European states, such as Slovenia and the Czech Republic, recorded population increases only due to positive net migration. It is interesting that growth was recorded due to natural change only in Türkiye.[40]

As is evident, the primary cause of a population decline in Europe is the low fertility rates. Fertility, commonly defined as the reproductive experience of a population, is analysed by examining 'the number of births as well as the characteristics of those births, along with characteristics of the individuals involved in reproductive activities'.[41] Fertility can be measured in terms of the number of births occurring within a population. Various measures are used to describe fertility, including crude birth rate, general fertility rate, and specific fertility rates. Crude birth rate calculates the number of births relative to the total population, expressing it as the number of births per 1,000 population.[42] It is calculated by dividing the total number of births for a given year by the midyear total population for that year; this quotient is then expressed as the number of births per 1,000 population.[43] The general fertility rate more closely limits the measurement of the base to persons actually at risk of the event, and it adjusts the denominator of the rate by focusing on the population at

38 Fargues, 2011, p. 2.
39 Eurostat, 2023a, para. 1.
40 Eurostat, 2023b, tab. 3.
41 Thomas, 2018, p. 101.
42 Murdock and Ellis, 2020, p. 115.
43 Thomas, 2018, p. 102.

risk.[44] It is expressed in terms of births per 1,000 women of the ages in which child-bearing is most likely to occur: 15–44 or 15–49 years.[45] Finally, specific fertility rates indicate the greatest specificity, measuring events relative to the specific population at risk (e.g. births to women aged 20–30 years relative to the number of women aged 20–30 years). The advantage of using specific rates is their ability to measure events more precisely relative to the persons most likely to experience them.[46] One good example of specific rates is the age-specific fertility rate.[47]

An additional measure is the child-woman ratio, indicating 'the number of persons 0 to 4 years of age divided by the number of females of child-bearing age'.[48] Finally, a widely discussed and utilised measure is the total fertility rate, which is

> … the sum of the age-specific fertility rates for all women in the child-bearing ages, and when adjusted to be per-person-specific, indicates the number of children that the average woman would have in her reproductive lifetime if she aged through her reproductive years exposed to the age-specific rates prevailing at a specific point in time.[49]

Among the commonly discussed levels of total fertility is the rate of 2.1, known as the replacement rate of fertility.[50] This is the total fertility rate required for mere population replacement, as the average woman must replace both herself and her mate.

In 2021, the total fertility rate within the EU stood at 1.53 live births per woman, marking a slight uptick from the 2020 figure of 1.50. The EU's total fertility rate had experienced fluctuations, reaching a low of 1.43 in 2001 and 2002, then rising to a relatively high point of 1.57 in 2010. Subsequently, it underwent a modest decrease to 1.51 in 2013, followed by slight rebounds until 2017. However, from 2017 onwards, the indicator began to decline again, reaching a low of 1.50 in 2020. The observed increase in 2021 indicates a shift compared to the previous year.[51] However, the total fertility rate in the EU is below the replacement rate of fertility and will remain low in the future. The situation is similar in Central European states, in which total fertility rates vary from 1.33 in Poland to 1.83 in the Czech Republic.[52]

The question arises about whether one demographic factor can substitute for another, specifically if migration can effectively replace low fertility rates in Europe, thereby acting as the rejuvenation factor in population dynamics. The concept of replacement

44 Murdock and Ellis, 2020, p. 117.
45 Thomas, 2018, p. 103.
46 Murdock and Ellis, 2020, p. 117.
47 Thomas, 2018, pp. 103–105.
48 Murdock and Ellis, 2020, p. 124.
49 Murdock and Ellis, 2020, p. 126.
50 Thomas, 2018, p. 106.
51 Eurostat, 2023c, para. 1.
52 Ibid.

demographic factors and the perspective of population dynamics at equilibrium can be traced back to the works of demographers from the 18th century, including figures such as Pastor Johann-Peter Süssmilch (1707–1767).[53] As P. Demeny noted, 'Europe is not an island, surrounded by uninhabited deserts or endless oceans. It has neighbors that follow their own peculiar demographic logic'.[54] Near Europe are located regions with the fastest growing populations globally, such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. In the context of the EU, European states that are not EU members are grappling with similar or even more severe demographic challenges. Consequently, high rates of international migration will likely involve migration from the abovementioned non-European regions. The key question is whether this form of international migration can counteract the population decline and boost fertility rates in Europe.

As of 2011, the EU has witnessed significant positive net migration balances. Nevertheless, the overall growth of the EU population has been modest, and in some cases, even negative. Although fertility rates have increased, they still fell below the replacement rate needed for population growth sustainability. The influx of refugees and migrants from 2016 to 2023 has, in essence, merely delayed the inevitable population decline. While immigration can gloss over the real demographic problems, it is insufficient to generate lasting and sustainable population growth.

The strategy of "replacement migration" to maintain the population size presents specific challenges. Notably, high immigration rates may lead to shifts in the social, cultural, political, and racial characteristics of European countries. Additionally, migration has been identified as a source of socioeconomic and security challenges. In light of these considerations, D. Coleman raised questions about the feasibility of multicultural societies with multiple identities and loyalties succeeding in European democracies.[55] The contrary perspective underscores the importance of intermarriages and interactions between migrants and host societies, potentially leading migrants to adopt the ideas, values, and practices to which they are exposed. Given that the extent of migrants' exposure depends on various factors, P. Fargues concluded that 'the better socio-economic integration of the migrant, the smoother the encounter of migrants' and natives' cultural identities'.[56] In the case of high migration rates in the future, the population shift will impact European states, posing an increasingly challenging task for the integration of large migrant communities. Low fertility rates in combination with high immigration rates will certainly affect the population composition of European countries. The primary concern that European policymakers will need to address is how European states can utilise migration as, at the very least, a temporary solution for population decline without losing their cultural identity.

However, immediate EU population growth can be achieved through not only immigration but also enlargement. Initially, expansion of the EU will impact the size

53 Héran, 2023, p. 87.
54 Demeny, 2003, p. 4.
55 Coleman, 2006, pp. 84–85.
56 Fargues, 2011, p. 15.

of only the EU and not the entire continent. Many countries set to join the EU face similar or even more severe demographic challenges, including ageing populations, high emigration rates, and low population growth. The current situation in Eastern Europe does not contribute positively to the EU's demography, as countries with the potential to significantly increase the total population, such as Russia, Ukraine, and Türkiye, are far from becoming new EU members. Nevertheless, EU enlargement could boost its overall population and help Member States adopt policies and legislation to enhance fertility rates across all European countries. The words of P. Fargues appear more relevant than ever: 'If the EU wants to maintain its present level of influence in world affairs, immigration will not suffice, and enlargement combined with nation-building seems to be the only solution'.[57]

5. Population ageing, workforce shortages, and migration in Europe

One outcome of technological and scientific progress and medical advances is an extended life expectancy. Although this trend is undeniably one of the most positive outcomes of modern progress, it presents several challenges. Primarily, the increase in the non-working-age population will impact the healthcare system as its resources will need to be expanded. Moreover, the length of retirement will increase, affecting the old-age dependency ratios.

Ageing of the European population is a consequence of not only modern progress but also low fertility and mortality rates. In Europe, fewer children are born and fewer older people die, leading to an increasing share of older individuals among the net population. The shift in the population structure towards older ages is projected to persist in the future.[58] The population within the working-age bracket (20–64 years) is anticipated to experience a more pronounced decline, decreasing from 265 million in 2019 to 217 million in 2070. This decline is attributed to factors such as fertility rates, life expectancy, and patterns of migration flows.[59] Consequently, the demographic landscape of Europe will transform, characterised by high proportions of older individuals and low proportions of the working-age population.[60] These trends are anticipated to result in a doubling of the old-age dependency ratios by 2050, regardless of immigration rates.[61]

57 Fargues, 2011, p. 16.
58 Goujon et al., 2021, p. 5.
59 European Commission, 2021, p. 3.
60 Goujon et al., 2021, p. 13.
61 Fargues, 2011, p. 10.

Some authors outlined the opportunities of an ageing population. Bloom et al. highlighted that increased allocation of resources to the training, education, and health of workers can mitigate the decline in the workforce resulting from lower fertility rates. If such investments contribute to a higher level of human capital within the workforce, it could improve the productivity and overall living standards.[62] A decline in fertility will allow more women to enter the labour force, and because of the increased life expectancy, a higher portion of income will be allocated to savings,[63] which will push the real interest rate down.[64] Furthermore, low mortality rates and population ageing may increase the skill premium.[65] However, many authors perceived population ageing as a threat to the economic growth and sustainability of health care systems. It will have huge impact on productivity and the structure of consumption.[66] Finally, some authors believe that the current European welfare schemes will become financially unsustainable.[67]

Migration is frequently considered a solution to the problems of population ageing and labour shortages. Typically, migrants arriving in Europe, particularly those from Africa and Asia, are younger than the native population, and they contribute to the expansion of the labour force.[68] Mathematically, an increase in the working-age population could change the demographic structure of the population towards a higher proportion of young population. Furthermore, migrants usually make families in host countries, and, as already mentioned, they have higher fertility rates than their native peers.

However, demographic analysis has shown that immigration cannot be a substitute for decreased fertility.[69] This is because immigration rates need to be extremely high to prevent population ageing. The most prominent UN report on replacement migration showed that the EU (having only 15 members at the time) will need 674 million immigrants until 2050 to maintain a balance between the proportions of populations older than 65 years and aged 15–64 years.[70] As it is unlikely that such an influx of immigrants would ever happen, the ageing of the European population is inevitable.

Migration contributes to the workforce and population structure directly, as migrants belong to the working-age population upon their arrival. However, the population added through permanent migration undergoes the ageing process similar to natives.[71] If migrants are increasingly relied upon to compensate for retiring natives,

62 Bloom et al., 2015, p. 654.
63 Bloom, Canning, and Graham, 2003, p. 337.
64 Teulings and Baldwin, 2014, p. 14.
65 Afonso et al., 2019, p. 130.
66 Börsch-Supan, 2003, pp. 6–7.
67 Fargues, 2011, p. 10.
68 Peri, 2020.
69 Paterno, 2011, p. 66.
70 United Nations Secretariat, Population Division, 2000, p. 3.
71 Fargues, 2011, p. 12.

a continuous influx of new migrants is required to offset the retirement of earlier migrants. Therefore, replacement migration cannot curb ageing; rather, it initiates a spiral in which the ageing of migrants can only be offset by more migrants being called in.

Migrants from developing countries often exhibit higher birth rates than their native peers. As they enter the labour force, their children contribute to mitigating the increase in old-age dependency ratios. However, it is anticipated that the birth rates will converge over one generation. Ultimately, while permanent migration may temporarily delay the rise of old-age dependency, it is not a sustainable long-term solution.

International migration is often analysed in light of the economic benefit it allegedly brings. The period of a fast workforce decline has started, as predicted by demographers, and it will probably affect the economic goals of European states. Deficits of the working-age population have increased, especially at the bottom of the professional ladder, and low-skilled migration has increased. The Eastern European pools of migrants have dried up, especially from Western Balkans. New migrant waves will predominantly consist of migrants from outside Europe. As Loichinger and Marois pointed out, a rise in migration flows is not expected to significantly mitigate the economic impacts of population ageing. Their projections indicate that even if migration were to double, there would be only a marginal enhancement in the labour force dependency ratio, and broader trends towards high levels of ageing would remain largely unchanged.[72] Therefore they concluded that

> The effect of migration on derived labor force indicators such as the labor force dependency ratio of the host region are relatively small. In short, migration, while increasing the population size, affects both the active and the inactive population at the same pace, and as so, has only little effect on the labor force dependency ratio.[73]

Both ageing of the population and a workforce decrease can be reversed if birth rates return to the replacement levels. This aim can be achieved with some legal measures as well. Pro-natalist legislation can contribute to increasing fertility. However, even if pro-natalist policies brought results, they would impact the working-age population in 20 years. In the short and medium terms, ageing of the population together with workforce shortages seem ineluctable.

72 Loichinger and Marois, 2018, p. 50.
73 Loichinger and Marois, 2018, p. 49.

6. Impact of migration on the religious landscape of Europe

As mentioned earlier, European countries have witnessed a rise in migration from within Europe and from former colonial states, regions affected by conflicts (e.g. the Balkans, Middle East, and Afghanistan), and nations that have historically supplied workforce to developed Western European countries. Among these immigrants, some originate from countries currently undergoing religious revival,[74] while others are from a diverse set of religious denominations usually different from those dominant in host societies.[75] Moreover, religiosity is higher among migrants,[76] even second-generation migrants.[77] This supports the notion that migrants are more successful in transmitting their religion to the next generation.[78] Considering that fertility rates appear to be higher among migrants compared to their native peers,[79] immigrants will influence religious diversity in European states, even in the absence of further migration.[80] Therefore, religion and religious organisations can have a key role in integrating migrants in destination societies, while migrants will shape the future religious landscape of Europe.

Migrants' religiosity has the potential to slow down the process of secularisation of European societies.[81] Since migrants usually come from less secular societies and are preserving their religious beliefs through generations, the pace of their secularisation will shape the process of European societies' secularisation. The classic secularisation theory interconnects modernisation with secularisation.[82] Even though some religious practices of migrants can resist secularising trends,[83] they cannot affect the general process of secularisation.[84]

As mentioned earlier, the total population of Europe will decrease if no immigration occurs. The total number of Christians in Europe is projected to reduce by about 100 million people to reach 54 million in 2050. Moreover, the Jewish population will decline from 1.4 million in 2010 to 1.2 million in 2050. All other religious groups are projected to grow. Their growth will be fuelled by demographic

74 Pollack and Rosta, 2017, pp. 211–212.
75 Guveli and Platt, 2023, p. 2.
76 Aleksynska and Chiswick, 2013, pp. 588–589.
77 De Hoon and Van Tubergen, 2014, p. 203.
78 De Hoon and Van Tubergen, 2014, pp. 203–204; Molteni and Van Tubergen, 2022, p. 623; Molteni and Dimitriadis, 2021, p. 1486.
79 Kulu and González-Ferrer, 2014, p. 421.
80 Guveli and Platt, 2023, p. 5.
81 Guveli and Platt, 2023, p. 2.
82 Berger, 2011, p. 90; Wilson, 1982, p. 95.
83 Drouhot, 2021, pp. 795–851; Molteni and Van Tubergen, 2022, pp. 623–624; Guveli and Platt, 2011, pp. 1023–1024.
84 Spohn, 2009, p. 370.

processes, including higher fertility rates, younger population, and gains via migration and religious switching.[85]

The only religious group in Europe with a fertility rate at the replacement level is Europe's Muslims. Fertility rates are below the replacement level for all other major religious groups, including the religiously unaffiliated, who have the lowest fertility rates. However, the total number of the religiously unaffiliated is projected to grow because of religious switching, which will affect only the total number of Christians and not a significant number of other religious groups.[86]

Migration will significantly impact the religious landscape of Europe in the coming years. Continued migration from Asia to Europe is expected to result in an increase in the share of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, adherents of folk religions, and other religions among the European population. In contrast, migration is anticipated to decrease the share of the region's population that identifies as Christian or unaffiliated. In a projection without migration, the Muslim share of Europe's population is estimated to grow from the current level of 4.9% to 7.4% by 2050. In a medium migration scenario, the share of Muslims in Europe is projected to reach 11.2%, while a high migration scenario suggests that Muslims could constitute 14% of Europe's population by 2050.[87] These projections exclude the Western Balkan countries, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, with overall projections for the entire continent showing minimal differences.[88] There is a possibility that Muslim populations in Europe may return to their countries of origin when conditions improve there. However, historical precedents from Germany show that this is unlikely. As migration scholar Philip Martin noted decades ago, 'there is nothing more permanent than temporary workers and traders'.[89] It can be concluded that migration has played a role and will continue to contribute to the European societies' religious diversity, which is expected to increase as a result of demographic processes in the years to come.

The migration of adherents from various religious groups presents challenges to the existing legislation that governs the legal status of religious organisations in European states. Issues such as legal recognition of religious groups and communities, state financial support for religion, religious instruction in public schools, and status of religious symbols in the public sphere are among the most significant matters that need to be reconsidered and re-regulated to effectively accommodate the religious rights of migrants. True and sustainable pluralism involves not only respecting the individual right to freedom of religion and belief but also acknowledging the collective and corporate rights of religious organisations. This holds true for migrants and their religious communities as well.

85 Pew Research Center, 2015, para. 1.
86 Pew Research Center, 2015, para. 3.
87 Pew Research Center, 2017, p. 5.
88 Pew Research Center, 2015, para. 2.
89 Martin, 1994, p. 169.

7. Conclusion

Demography, as the study of human populations, plays a crucial role in shaping social policies, managing populations, and regulating migrations. This study directs attention to the demographic profile of European countries, notably central European states, and delves into how migrations influence their demographic landscapes. The study adopts an inclusive definition of migrant, which is treated as an umbrella term covering refugees, foreign workers, students, and various categories of "people on the move".

The global population has witnessed sustained growth, but Europe, experiencing consistently low growth rates since 1950, encountered stagnation by the end of the 20th century. Migration has played a crucial role in reversing this trend, contributing to increased growth rates. Central European countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Czechia, and Slovakia exhibit varying scenarios regarding foreign-born populations. While some countries such as Poland and Hungary have experienced significant growth, the proportion of foreign-born residents remains relatively low compared to the EU average.

The OECD nations reported remarkable levels of international migration in 2022. New asylum applications, labour migration, temporary labour migration, and international student numbers all saw notable increases. Family migration remained the leading category for new permanent-type migration. Migrant populations tend to concentrate in specific regions within countries, particularly in the capital and urban areas. Non-EU migrants in Europe exhibit a stronger inclination towards clustering in urbanised regions. Central European capital-city regions, except in Poland, house the highest proportions of immigrant populations.

As of 2023, Europe's population has experienced modest growth, reaching approximately 742.2 million. However, a historical decline in growth rates since the 1960s, coupled with the projection of losing 11% of its population by 2050 without immigration, raises concerns about long-term sustainability. The EU witnessed a population decline between 2020 and 2022, largely due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but the population rebounded to 448.4 million by 1 January 2023, attributed to increased migratory movements and displaced persons from Ukraine. The role of migration in offsetting Europe's demographic challenges is apparent, with positive net migration playing a crucial role in population growth, especially as fertility rates remain below replacement levels.

While migration has contributed to population growth, questions arise about its long-term effectiveness and the challenges it poses to the cultural, social, and political characteristics of European societies. The concept of "replacement migration" faces scrutiny, emphasising the need for the socioeconomic integration to ensure successful encounters between migrants and natives. Potential EU enlargement could be a way to address immediate population growth, even though potential new members face similar demographic challenges. The complex interplay of fertility rates, migration, and policy considerations underscores the multifaceted nature of Europe's

demographic landscape and the necessity for thoughtful policymaking to navigate these challenges.

The increase in non-working-age individuals places a strain on healthcare systems and elevates the old-age dependency ratios in Europe. Despite potential opportunities outlined by some authors, such as investments in education and health to enhance workforce productivity, the overarching perception is that population ageing presents a significant threat to economic growth, productivity, and sustainability of welfare configurations in Europe. Migration has been considered a potential solution to mitigate these challenges, as migrants often belong to the working-age population and contribute to economic activity. However, demographic analysis reveals that immigration alone cannot substitute for declining fertility rates, and the sheer magnitude of immigration required to counteract population ageing is deemed impractical.

Moreover, while migration temporarily influences the workforce and population structure, relying on continuous immigration to offset the ageing of earlier migrants creates an unsustainable cycle. If migration were to double, its impact on labour force indicators and the overall age structure would be limited. The long-term solution lies in addressing low fertility rates through pro-natalist policies. However, ageing of the population and workforce shortages are anticipated to persist in the short to medium term, necessitating comprehensive strategies to navigate these demographic shifts.

As migrants, particularly from regions experiencing religious revival, bring diverse religious denominations to Europe, their higher religiosity, even into the second generation, contributes to shaping the future religious makeup of European societies. The interplay between migrants' higher fertility rates and the transmission of religious beliefs suggests that, even without further migration, immigrants will significantly influence religious diversity in European states. The role of religion and religious organisations emerges as crucial in the integration of migrants into the destination societies, illustrating the intricate relationship between migration and the evolving religious fabric of Europe.

Migrants' religiosity has the potential to influence the pace of secularisation in European societies. Coming from less secularised societies, migrants' preservation of religious beliefs across generations may impact the overall trajectory of secularisation. The projection that the total number of Christians in Europe is expected to decline, while other religious groups, including Europe's Muslims, are projected to grow, highlights the profound demographic consequences of migration on the continent's religious composition. The expected rise in the proportion of Muslims, alongside followers of other religions, highlights the necessity for a thorough reassessment and reformulation of legislation governing religion in European states. This is essential to adequately address the religious rights of migrants and establish sustainable pluralism within European societies.

Overall, migration, including international migration, lacks the potential to adequately address Europe's demographic challenges, encompassing issues such as population decline, ageing, low fertility rates, and labour shortages. Consequently,

efforts should be directed towards alternative approaches aimed at supporting the native population in increasing fertility rates, as this remains the sole effective solution for ensuring stable economic growth. Such initiatives should involve the development of appropriate legal regulations that foster an increase in fertility rates. Moreover, labour legislation should be enhanced to increase productivity and facilitate ongoing education and skill development within the workforce. There should be flexible employment options during retirement, and the mandatory retirement age ought to be eliminated. All these measures will not affect the numbers globally, but it can increase the working-age population. This approach stands as the singular viable solution to address the demographic shift in European countries and maintain a labour market capable of supporting economic growth in the future.

References

Afonso, O., Gil, P.M., Neves, P.C., Sequeira, T.N. (2019) 'Demographic Change, Wage Inequality, and Technology' in Bucci, A., Prettner, K., Prskawetz, A. (eds.) *Human Capital and Economic Growth*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21599-6_4 124.

Aleksynska, M., Chiswick, B. R. (2013) 'The determinants of religiosity among immigrants and the native born in Europe', *Review of Economics of the Household*, 11(4), pp. 563–598; https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-013-9188-7.

Bean, F.D., Brown, S. K. (2015) 'Demographic Analyses of Immigration' in Brettell, C. B., Hollifield, J. F. (eds.) *Migration theory: Talking across disciplines*, Third edition, New York: Routledge.

Berger, P. (2011) *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. New York: Open Road Media.

Bloom, D. E., Canning, D. & Graham, B. (2003) 'Longevity and Life Cycle Savings', *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 105(3), pp. 319–338; https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.t01-1-00001.

Bloom, D. E., Chatterji, S., Kowal, P. Peter Lloyd-Sherlock, McKee, M., Rechel, B., Rosenberg, L., Smith, J. P. (2015) 'Macroeconomic implications of population ageing and selected policy responses', *The Lancet*, 385(9968), pp. 649–657; https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)61464-1.

Börsch-Supan, A. (2003). 'Labor market effects of population aging' *Labour*, 17, pp. 5–44; https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9914.17.specialissue.2.

Brettell, C. B. (2015) 'Theorizing Migration in Anthropology: The Cultural, Social, Phenomenological, and Embodied Dimensions of Human Mobility' in Brettell, C. B., Hollifield, J. F. (eds.) *Migration theory: Talking across disciplines*. Third edition, New York: Routledge, pp. 194–231; https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003121015-6.

Brettell, C. B., Hollifield, J. F (2015) 'Introduction: Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines' in Brettell, C. B., Hollifield, J. F. (eds.) *Migration theory: Talking across disciplines*, Third edition, New York: Routledge, pp. 1-43; https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003121015-1.

Carling, J. (2023) 'The phrase 'refugees and migrants' undermines analysis, policy and protection' *International Migration*, 61(3), pp. 399–403. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.13147.

Carney, M. A. (2015) *The Unending Hunger: Tracing Women and Food Insecurity across Borders*. Berkeley: University of California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520959675.

Coleman, D. (2006) 'Europe's Demographic Future: Determinants, Dimensions, and Challenges, *Population and Development Review*, The Political Economy of Global Population Change, 1950-2050, 32, pp. 52–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2006.tb00003.x.

Constant, A. F., O. Nottmeyer and K. F. Zimmermann (2013) 'The Economics of Circular Migration' in Constant, A. F. and K. F. Zimmermann (eds.) *International Handbook on the Economics of Migration*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 55–74; https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782546078.00010.

De Hoon, S., Van Tubergen, F. (2014) 'The religiosity of children of immigrants and natives in England, Germany, and the Netherlands: The role of parents and peers in class', *European Sociological Review*, 30(2), pp. 194–206; https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcu038.

Demeny, P. (2003) 'Population Policy Dilemmas in Europe at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century', *Population and Development Review*, 29(1), pp. 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2003.00001.x.

Drouhot, L. G. (2021). 'Cracks in the melting pot? Religiosity and assimilation among the diverse Muslim population in France', *American Journal of Sociology*, 126(4), pp. 795–851; https://doi.org/10.1086/712804.

European Commission (2021) *The 2021 Ageing Report: Economic and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States (2019-2070)*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

Eurostat (2023a) *Population and population change statistics* [Online]. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=Population_and_population_change_statistics#EU_population_shows_a_strong_increase_in_2022 (Accessed: 27 November 2023).

Eurostat (2023b) *Contribution of natural change and net migration (and statistical adjustment) to population change, 2022* [Online]. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Tab_3_rev_Contribution_of_natural_change_and_net_migration_(and_statistical_adjustment)_to_population_change,_2022.png (Accessed: 27 November 2023).

Eurostat (2023c) *Fertility statistics* [Online]. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Fertility_statistics#Almost_half_of_children_born_in_the_EU_in_2021_were_born_from_first-time_mothers (Accessed: 27 November 2023).

Fargues, P. (2011) *International Migration and Europe's Demographic Challenge*. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute.

Goujon A., Jacobs-Crisioni C., Natale F., Lavalle C. (2021) *The demographic landscape of EU territories: challenges and opportunities in diversely ageing regions*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

Guillard, A. (2010) *Elements de Statistique Humaine ou Demographie Comparee*. Charleston: Nabu Press.

Guveli A., Platt L. (2023) 'Religiosity of Migrants and Natives in Western Europe 2002-2018: Convergence and Divergence', *European Journal of Population*, 39(9), pp. 1–27; https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-023-09660-9.

Guveli, A., Platt, L. (2011) 'Understanding the religious behavior of Muslims in the Netherlands and the UK', *Sociology*, 45(6), pp. 1023–1024; https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038511416165.

Hauser, P., Duncan, O. D. (1959) *The Study of Population*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Héran, F. (2023) 'Demography and Migration: The Wildcard in Population Dynamics' in Brettell, C. B., Hollifield, J. F. (eds.) *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*. Fourth edition, New York and London: Routledge, pp. 78–129; https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003121015-3.

International Organization for Migration (2011) *International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration*, Geneva: International Organization for Migration [Online]. Available at: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml25_1.pdf (Accessed: 27 September 2023).

International Organization for Migration (2019) *International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration*, Geneva: International Organization for Migration [Online]. Available at: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf (Accessed: 27 September 2023).

Kulu, H., González-Ferrer, A. (2014) 'Family dynamics among immigrants and their descendants in Europe: Current research and opportunities', *European Journal of Population*, 30, pp. 411–435; https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-014-9322-0.

Loichinger, E., Marois, G. (2018) 'Education-specific labour force projections for EU-28 countries' in Lutz, W., Stilianakis, N., Stonawski, M., Goujon, A., Samir, K. C. (eds.) *Demographic and human capital scenarios for the 21st century*, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, pp. 43–51; https://doi.org/10.2760/835878.

Martin, P. L. (1994) 'Comparative Migration Policies' *The International Migration Review*, 28(1), pp. 164–170; https://doi.org/10.2307/2547031.

Statista Research Department (2023) *Population of Europe 1950-2023* [Online]. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1106711/population-of-europe/ (Accessed: 27 November 2023).

Molteni, F., Dimitriadis, I. (2021) 'Immigrants' religious transmission in Southern Europe: reaction or assimilation? Evidence from Italy' *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 22, 1485–1504; https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-021-00815-3.

Molteni, F., Van Tubergen, F. (2022) 'Immigrant generation and religiosity: A study of Christian immigrant groups in 33 European countries', *European Societies*, 24(5), pp. 605–627; https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2022.2044067.

Murdock, E., Keely, C. B. (2000) 'Demography and International Migration' in Brettell, C. B., Hollifield, J. F. (eds.) *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*. First edition, New York: Routledge, pp. 43–60.

Murdock, S. H., Ellis, D. R. (2020) *Applied Demography: An Introduction to Basic Concepts, Methods, and Data*, New York: Routledge.

OECD (2023) *International Migration Outlook 2023*. Paris: OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/b0f40584-en.

OECD, European Union (2018) *Settling in 2018: Indicators of Immigrant Integration*, Paris, Brussels: OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307216-en.

Ottonelli, V., Torresi, T. (2013) 'When is migration voluntary' *International Migration Review*, 47(4), pp. 783–813; https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12048.

Paterno, A. (2011) 'Is immigration the solution to population aging?', *Genus*, 67(3), pp. 65–82.

Peri, G. (2020) *Immigrant Swan Song, Finance & Development Magazine*, March 2020, pp. 26–29. [Online]. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2020/03/can-immigration-solve-the-demographic-dilemma-peri (Accessed: 27 November 2023).

Pew Research Center (2015) *The future of world religions: population growth projections, 2010-2050: Europe* [Online]. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2015/04/02/europe/#fn-22806-58 (Accessed: 2 October 2023).

Pew Research Center (2017) *Europe's growing Muslim population* [Online]. Available at: https://www.pewforum.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/11/FULL-REPORT-FOR-WEB-POSTING.pdf (Accessed: 2 October 2023).

Pijnenburg, A., Rijken, C. (2021) 'Moving beyond refugees and migrants: reconceptualising the rights of people on the move', *Interventions International Journal of Postcolonial Studies*, 23(2), pp. 273–293; https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2020.1854107.

Pollack, D., Rosta, G. (2017) *Religion and modernity. An international comparison*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801665.001.0001.

Ramji-Nogales J. (2017) 'Moving Beyond the Refugee Law Paradigm', *American Journal of International Law Unbound*, 111, pp. 8–12; https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2017.9.

Smil, V. (2005) 'The Next 50 Years: Unfolding Trends', *Population and Development Review*, 31(4), pp. 605–643; https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2005.00091.x.

Spohn, W. (2009) 'Europeanization, religion and collective identities in an enlarging Europe: A multiple modernities perspective', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 12(3), pp. 358–374; https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431009337351.

Teitelbaum, M. S. (2008) 'Demographic Analyses of International Migration' in Brettell, C. B., Hollifield, J. F. (eds.) *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*, Second edition, New York: Routledge, pp. 51–62.

Teulings, C., Baldwin, R. (2014) 'Introduction' in Teulings, C., Baldwin, R (eds.) *Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes, and Cures,* London: CEPR Press.

Thomas, R. (2018) *Concepts, Methods and Practical Applications in Applied Demography*, Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65439-3.

UNHCR (2016) UNHCR viewpoint: 'Refugee' or 'migrant' – Which is right? [Online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/stories/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-or-migrant-which-right (Accessed: 27 September 2023).

United Nations Secretariat, Population Division (2000) Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations? [Online]. Available at: https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/unpd-egm_200010_un_2001_replacementmigration.pdf (Accessed: 28 November 2023).

Willekens, F. (2015) 'Demographic Transitions in Europe and the World' in Matthijs, K., Neels, K., Timmerman, C., Haers, J. (eds.) *Population Change in Europe, the Middle-East and North Africa: Beyond the Demographic Divide*, First edn; London and New York: Routledge, pp. 13–44; https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315601496.

Wilson, B. (1982) *Religion in Sociological Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Winthrop, S. (2015) *When moving matters: Residential and economic mobility trends in America: 1880–2010*. Manhattan Institute, 10 November 2015 [Online]. Available at: https://manhattan.institute/article/when-moving-matters-residential-and-economic-mobility-trends-in-america-1880-2010. (Accessed: 27 September 2023).

Yusuf, F., Swanson, D., Martins, J. M. (2014) *Methods of Demographic Analysis*, Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6784-3.

Departure of men abroad in 2023: what has changed for military servicemen (2023) Visit Ukraine, 7 January 2023. [Online]. Available at: https://visitukraine.today/blog/1385/departure-of-men-abroad-in-2023-what-has-changed-for-military-servicemen (Accessed: 27 September 2023).